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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
In the Matter of the Estate of
·CLAUDIUS W A!LLICH, Deceased,
FRED R. W ALLI CH,

Petitioner and Appellant
- vs -

Case No.
10569

A. C W ALLI CH, et al.,

Cross-Petitioners
and Respondents.

APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING
Petitioner and Appellant Fred R. \Vallich petitions
for a rehearing after decision of the above entitled Court
filed November 15, 1966, on the following grounds:
1. rrhe Court misstates and fails to state or pass
upon some of the appellant's principal contentions which,
if correctly stated, would require reversal.
2. The decision relies in part upon extrinsic evidence
proferred by the respondents and at the same time fails
to pass upon the appellant's claim that the trial court
committed reversible error in refusing to admit extrinsic
evidence proferred by appellant.

2

I

THE COUR,T FAILS TO STATE OR PASS UPON
APPELLANT'S CLAIM THAT THE WAIVEH OF
ACCOUNTING HAS BEEN INCORPORATED IN A
DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION WHICH HAS BECOME FINAL AND IS RES ADJUDICATA UPON
THE ISSUE IN SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS.
Appellant's principal ground for reversal is that the
Decree of Distribution dated February 24, 1959, incorporated by reference all of paragraph 8 of the will of the
decedent, including the provision that no accounting shall
be required, and that this Decree of Distribution has
become final and is res adjudicata upon the issues here
presented.
In the opinion, the Court erroneously states that the
appellant "protests that the Court has no jurisdiction
over him to determine the honesty and propriety of his
dealings in connection with the trust."
Appellant has not attacked the jurisdiction of the
Court at any time.

By claiming that the final judgment of February
8, 1959, which relieves petitioner of the requirement for
filing an accounting, cannot now be set aside in the same

3
proceedings and petitioner be required to account in defiance of the precise terms of the prior final judgment,
the appellant relies upon the doctrine of res adjudicata
as applied in the cases cited jn appellant's briefs. 1 This
js not an attack upon the jurisdiction of the Court.
The Court had jurisdiction to determine whether
an accounting would be required of the trustee. It exercised that jurisdiction by determjning in its decree of
February 24, 1959, that no accounting would be required.
That determination has become final and is res adjudicata.
As declared in Miller v. Walker Bank, "except for
fraud" a decree of distribution which has become final
is not subject to attack. These proceedings do not involve
any claim or evidence of fraud. Appellant concedes that
if fraud were, charged in an appropriate proceeding, the
Court would have jurisdiction upon that issue.
The opinion evades facing the issue on this point by
failing to state that the waiv('r of accounting has been

1

Shattuck v. Shattuck, 192 P. 2d 229 (Ariz.)
In Re Wallace's Estate, 219 P.2d 910 (Cal.)
In Re Loring's Estate, 175 P.2d 524 (Cal.)
Brindley v. Mitchell, 228 P.2d 689 (Kan.)
Miller v. Walker Bank, 17 Ut. 2d 88, 404 P.2d 675
For quotations, see Brief of Appellant, pages 18-23, and Reply
Brief, pages 4-7.
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included in a prior final decree of distribution of this
Court in the same proceedings.
Instead, in the last sentence of the opinion the Court
states, "A provision in a document which would have
the effect of preventing one from being required to account ... is against public policy and will not be enforced."
In that one sentence if the Court would change the word
"document" to "judgment" or "final decree of distribution" the Court's error would he apparent.
The Court against misstates appellant's position in
the following language quoted from the opinion:
"The final point we direct attention to is
appellant's insistence that even as a trustee he
could not be required to render an accounting
. . . because of the provision in the will that 'in
the administration of the trust herein imposed
upon him, he shall act without the necessity of
making any accounting to any person or party."
The Court denounces this proposition as "specious
argument" and "untenable." As stated by the Court
(supra) this argument is indeed specious and untenable.
But this is not the argument made by appellant.
Appellant's argument is that the will provisions have
been incorporated in a decree of distribution which has
become final. The will, as such, is functus officio and

has been superseded by the final decree and is res adjudicata, having been incorporated in the decree. The opinion
establishes at the outset that the provisions of paragraph
8 of the will have been effectively incorporated in the
final decree. This includes the provision that no accounting may be required.
Appellant doe·s not rely upon the ·will, as stated in the
opinion, but upon the final decree of distribution.
The opinion cites authorities (Note 7) that the provisions in an intervivos trust not created by a judgment
which waive an accounting will not be enforced. The opinion fails to cite any authority for the proposition that a
provision in a final decree of distribution which waives
accounting will not be enforced. The opinion refuses to
cite, discuss or attempt to distinguish the appellant's
cases (Note 1, supra) from several states holding that an
invalid ·will provision which has been incorporated in a
final judgment is enforceable because it is res adjudicata.
It is manifestly unfair to misstate appellant's posi-

tion and then proceed to castigate it as "specious" and
"untenable.''
Appellant submits that a rPhearing should be granted
in furtherance of justice basrd upon this point a.lone.
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II

THE COURT FAILS TO STATE OR PASS UPON APPELLANT'S CLAIM THAT ERROR. \VAS
COMMITTEiD IN T'HE DENIAL OF ITS PROFERREiD EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH
TESTATOR'S INTENT, ALTHOUGH IN DE,CLARING A TRUST THE OPINION RELIES IN PART
UPON EXT'RINSIC EVIDENCE PROFERRED BY
RE8PONDENTS.
In Point V o.f Brief of Appellant it is argued at
length that certain detailed extrinsic evidence offered by
appellant should have been admitted to ascertain whether
a trust was intended by the will.
The opinion fails to touch upon this contention. But
in the course of the opinion the Court relies upon extrinsir evidence offered hy respondents in declaring a trust.
This evidence offered by respondents is the receipt~
signed by appellant "as trustee" and a change in the nameof the holder of the stock certificates.
For the many reasons set forth in the Brief of Appellant there are many ambiguities and contradictions
in paragraph 8 of the will.
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The refusal of the trial Court to admit the extrinsic
evidence proferred for the purpose of reso.Iving these ambiguities and of ascertaining the decedent's intent constituted error which deprived appellant of a full hearing
upon this issue and was therefore violative of the constitutional safeguards as to due process.
It is respectfully submitted that for the reasons herein set forth, a rehearing should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

SKEEN, WORSLEY,
SNOW & CHRISTENSEN

By -----------------------------------------------------Joseph J. Palmer
and
JohnL. Mace

Attorneys for Appellant
Fred R. Wallich

